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Democracy, governance and women’s rights are intimately intertwined. A democracy must 
ensure that 50% of its population - that is, its women - are treated fairly and accorded rights and 
protections. These rights and protections cannot be guaranteed unless the government possesses 
the necessary capacity and legitimacy to implement the rule of law fairly, efficiently and 
equitably. Hence, effective democracy and governance are essential for women’s rights. Four 
mechanisms linking the importance of democratic institutions and good governance to the status 
of women emerge in the literature on women’s rights. These mechanisms are related to the 
political culture of a nation, the political opportunity structure linked to democratic forms of 
governance, the domain of political rights, and the effective implementation of the rule of law to 
ensure the representation of women and their interests in a given polity.  
 
Democracy and good governance are beneficial to women in several ways. Democracies by 
default secure the interests of the entire population, including women, and they are more likely to 
underscore legal equality across gender groups. Further, democracies are able to secure the 
public and political spheres as sites for female contestation and advancement.
1
 Yet, democracies 
and good governance should not be conflated. Democracies alone however, are not sufficient to 
secure the interests of women. Democracies have to be able to govern competently and enforce 
the rule of law. That is, legal jurisprudence guaranteeing women’s rights in these democracies 
must not only exist, but it must also be enforced. Countries like India, and several in the former 
Soviet Union which are successful democracies, may not be able to guarantee women’s rights 
because of ineffective legal institutions and cultural norms that render women second class 
citizens. Hence, good governance is crucial for women’s rights. 
 
Democracies are also important for women because such political systems encourage forms of 
tolerance, acceptance and norms that are useful to women’s rights in general.
2
 Democracies 
reinforce granting rights to all citizens regardless of gender, race, family, tribe, and so on. Thus, 
democracies help reinforce values most important for the full incorporation of women as citizens 
of the state.  
 
Further, with democracy comes expanded political spaces that enable women to make the 
necessary demands on the state. Where women can mobilize, they can more effectively launch 
the concerns of women.
3
 The lack of such spaces has hurt women—or at least made them more 
vulnerable to patriarchal structures that claim to enhance their rights through pre-existing 
structures. Further, the state has guaranteed some rights to women so long as women reinforce 
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many of the authoritarian principles or the regime.
4
 Having said this, democracy should not be 
reified as a construct that is absolutely useful to women. Of course, women experience 
considerable levels of discrimination in the democratic world as well. Women of minority 
backgrounds and those who are poor, for example, experience marginalization in their everyday 
interactions with the state. Yet, the existence of democratic institutions allows for other groups to 
actively mobilize on behalf of such disenfranchised women. In the context of the Arab world, 
active political lobbying is more demanding due to the non-democratic nature of the state.  
 
Thus improvements in democracy and good governance are necessary for the enhancement of 
women across the region, but the challenges to democracy remain multiple and interrelated. 
Political reforms will not move forward under conditions of domestic repression, heightened 
security, and international support of authoritarian regimes. Even regimes that have adopted 
cosmetic reforms to please outside interests have become more repressive in nature. The U.S., 
for example, does little to question regimes when they violate basic citizen liberties, especially if 
those liberties are confiscated in the name of the War on Terror. American involvement in the 
Middle East, the promotion of authoritarian regimes, the Occupation of Iraq, and the continued 
Israeli Occupation thus far promoted anger against the West and its democracy promotion 
initiatives, including its gender programs. 
 
1. Obstacles to Democracy and Good Governance 
The events of 9-11 have also played into the Arab authoritarian project. Arab regimes are firmly 
and publicly fighting the War on Terror with their allied counterparts in Europe and the U.S.
5
 
This has meant increased interrogations in the Arab world and the outsourcing of such 
interrogations from the democratic West to these Arab states where such abuses are the norm and 
not the exception. Further, 9-11 has given Arab regimes that resist democratization more 
ammunition; these regimes use the Islamist threat as an excuse for their lack of democratization.
6
 
Yet, Islamists galvanize support when US policies in the region are seen to be oppressive and 
inhumane. In 2006, Egypt renewed its Emergency Laws under the pretext of needing more time 
to issue anti-terrorism laws. What is implied is that it is better to have authoritarianism than 
Islamism,. And although the vast majority of Muslims support neither fundamentalist aspirations 
nor Osama Bin Laden, citizens who vote Islamist are also considered culpable—witness Hamas’ 
2006 election win in Palestine. Hamas did not win on a platform promoting terrorism. In fact, it 
won for its willingness to fight internal corruption and the fact that a failed peace process 
foundered Fateh’s credibility. Of those polled after the elections, over 70% of those who 
supported Hamas stated that they supported a two-state solution. Yet, support for Hamas has 
been translated by the international community as simultaneous support for terror. As a result, 
the U.S. and Europe have placed an excruciating economic boycott on a population already on 
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the verge of economic collapse. With unprecedented levels of poverty, unemployment, and 
humanitarian catastrophe, it is difficult for the Palestinians to think of effective democracy, or for 
that matter gender equality, when the future state has become a mirage. Democracy is not a 
priority.  
 
Hence, democracy in the Arab World is not a straightforward project. Multiple influences shape 
its trajectory and suitability in the region. These range from domestic issues, like political 
culture, to the larger international issues like foreign occupation and involvement. Both sets of 
factors, the domestic and the international, have had a negative effect on the status of women in 




Yet, in some other cases, we’ve witnessed significant gains for women. The reform of the 
Mudawanna package in Morocco serves as one such case. Further, the Moroccan case 
demonstrates how international pressure, a committed monarch and continued pressure by the 
women’s movements resulted in concessions from the regime in favor of women.  
 
Before the passage of substantial reforms in Morocco’s personal status laws in 2003, women’s 
access to public life was guided by the notion of guardianship. Women needed the approval of 
their male legal guardians before they could legally work, travel or attend university. Further, the 
existing moudawana laws supported the institution of polygamy, and women had few rights to 
initiate divorce. The oral divorce (talaq) remained common and a major threat to women’s 
advancements.
8
   
 
This would change in 2003. Moroccan women were granted one of the most generous reform 
packages in the Arab world. Wives’ duty to obey their husbands was abolished, and both spouses 
were made responsible for their households and families. Second, women no longer required the 
permission of a male legal guardian to marry, the minimum marriage age was raised to 18, and 
polygamy was substantially restricted. And third, divorce was made easier for women, while 
men could no longer divorce through the pronunciation of talaq.  These gains for women have 
been extraordinarily valuable and seen as some of the most liberal reforms on women in the 
region. Certainly, today they serve as a model to be emulated elsewhere.  
 
However, Morocco also serves as a clear example of a country that lacks the necessary levels of 
democracy, rule of law institutionalization, and human development to effectively implement the 
reforms successfully. For example, it is true that even with the moudawana women will have few 
legal channels to exercise their new rights, since the rule of law in Morocco is weak and the legal 
system is rather dysfunctional. Further, more than two thirds of Morocco’s women are illiterate, 
knowledge of the moudawana changes is not widespread, and the excruciating poverty of 
Moroccan men and women may well limit the benefit from these new laws. Nonetheless, these 
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reforms are considered major advances for women and in fact are some of the most progressive 
laws in the Arab world.    
 
The reforms were possible because of three inter-related dynamics: women’s civil society 
activism, international influence, and the commitment of the monarchy to institute the reform 
package. Moroccan women’s movements have been demanding reforms since the early 
1970’s.Women’s groups emerged in the 1970’s and 80’s to demand their rights and call for 
reform of the existing moudawana laws,  culminating in the 1990s ―million signatures‖ 
campaign against the moudawana. Some advances were made under King Hasan II, who in 1992 
signed an earlier version of the 2003 reforms that improved women’s status while still falling 
short of their expectations. The push for reforms continued, and in 1995, the King, 
singlehandedly, eliminated the requirement that women have their guardian’s signature in order 
to obtain a passport.  In 1999-2000, women again mobilized to demand additional reforms, and 
King Mohammad VI, who in fact supported the reforms, had to withdraw legal deliberation at 
the time due to popular opposition by Islamist groups.   
 
As political liberalization in the kingdom allowed proponents of the women’s reforms continued 
space to advance their agenda, so too did it allow for increasing Islamic activism against the 
reforms.
9
 The religious establishment, which had grown more active in political and social life 
during liberalization, openly campaigned against the proposed moudawana changes.  The 
Moroccan League of Ulema, an official state body, declared that the plan would undermine 
Islamic jurisprudence, loosen morals in the kingdom, destroy the sanctity of marriage and make 
it more difficult for men to marry, a position supported by the Minister of Islamic Affairs. Both 
Islamist groups in Morocco, the PJD and the Justice and Charity movement, attacked the reform 
package as a ―US-American imperialist conspiracy designed to destroy Islamic culture.‖
10
    
 
Nevertheless, the King pressed on with the reforms. He had signaled his sympathy for improving 
women’s position in a 1999 speech, when he asked ―how can we expect to achieve progress and 
prosperity when women, which (sic) constitute half of society, have their interests taken away; 
when the rights with which our holy religion has endowed them, to make them equal to men, are 
being ignored?‖ On October 10, 2003, the king presented the Moroccan parliament with his plan 
to initiate the new modern family law, anchoring his rationale for the plan in an Islam ―which 
advocated human dignity, equality and harmonious relations, as well as cohesiveness of the 
Malikite rite of ijtihad, thanks to which Islam is a suitable religion for all times and places.‖ The 
king grounded his explanations in the teachings of Islam and interpretations of the sharia. 
Further, the king won support from the leadership of such Islamic groups like the PJD, despite 
the fact that they had rejected the reforms earlier on. Even Nadia Yassine, daughter of Sheikh 
Yassine (leader of the Justice and Charity movement), supported some of the initiatives of the 
reform package. She indicated her willingness to endorse the reforms when she claimed that the 
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old moudawana was not sacred text and advocated its replacement with a more Islamically 
appropriate legal guide.
11
    
 
Thus, Morocco is an important case to analyze in terms of appreciating how democratic 
openings, along with international efforts to support such movements, resulted in the positive 
outcomes that we witness for women. 
 
2. Connections between Gender Opinions, Gender Outcomes, and Democracy  
Several strands in the political culture debate emphasize the importance of attitudes favorable 
towards women for democracy. Societies that have unfavorable opinions towards gender equality 
are also less tolerant in general. As such, the democratic political culture essential for the 
maintenance and functioning of democratic institutions is lacking in these societies. Ronald 
Inglehart and Pippa Norris, while arguing that these favorable attitudes towards women are 
necessary for a democratic political culture, also note that these value shifts are linked to 
economic development projects. As countries industrialize, they maintain, more women enter the 
workforce, become more educated, have smaller families and obtain the right to vote. Hence, 
industrialization and economic development—components of modernization—are pertinent 
vehicles that empower women and lead to value shifts important for women’s equality. Not only 
does democracy figure largely in this analysis, but good governance should also not be 
underestimated. Effective governments, that is, are able to move their countries along solid 
economic trajectories. These economic trajectories will be a theme captured below.  
 
The Arab world shares the lowest public opinion attitudes on gender equality than any other 
region in the world (see Table 1 below). Arab societies are more likely to believe that men make 
better political leaders; University education is better for a boy than for a girl; and when jobs are 
scarce, men should be entitled to the jobs that do exist. Not only are the attitudes most negative 
in the region, but they are directly linked to negative objective indicators on women. In the 
context of the Arab World, negative attitudes towards women are directly linked to gender 
objective indicators that disservice women. That is, countries in the Arab region with 
unfavorable attitudes towards gender equality are also the same countries that tend to perform 
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Table1 : Mean values from World Values Survey,
12
 countries and regions 
(lower score signifies poorer attitudes) 
 















    
South/Southeast Asia 2.36 2.80 1.62 
Central Asia 2.01 2.67 1.45 
    
Arab World 1.82 2.77 1.27 
Africa 2.30 3.07 1.71 
Eastern Europe 2.25 2.94 1.75 
Developed Countries 3.02 3.30 1.92 
 
 
Examining gender outcomes that include women in parliament (2000), women in government 
(2000), the literacy gap, the economic activity ratio, life expectancy, and education ratio and 
controlling for 1990 logged GDP, percentage of population living in urban areas, income 
inequality, fuel exports as percentage of GDP, degree of democracy in neighborhood and a 
country’s previous experience with democracy,
13
 we find that attitudes negatively structure 
women’s advancements. Countries that score low on gender equality attitudes—those more 
likely to favor men over women—are also likely to have a lower number of women in 
parliament, a lower number of women in government, and lower levels of female literacy, 
economic activity, and education.
14
 Gender attitudes were a significant factor explaining all the 
objective gender indicators except for life expectancy. However, other variables also remained 
significant in the equations. The level of urbanization was significant in all but the education rate 
model. The Gini variable
15
 was significant in the economic activity model and literacy gap 
models, with more inequality disadvantaging women. Further, previous experience with 
democracy was significant in the education ratio, literacy gap, and life expectancy models. Those 
countries with a stronger democratic history scored better on these indicators. Yet, the evidence 
is compelling that attitudinal predispositions matter for the standing of women. Societies that 
have less favorable attitudes towards gender also have a worse record on women. 
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14 Please see Amaney Jamal and Vickie Langohr. ―The Democratic Deficit and Gender Attitudes: Do Attitudes 
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3. Gender Advancements and Remaining Challenges 
Women in the Arab world enjoy the smallest share of parliamentary seats worldwide. They 
occupy only 9.5% of all parliamentary seats in the region,
16
 as compared to 18.8% in sub-
Saharan Africa and 18.5% in Asia. Women occupy 4 of 128 (3.1 %) seats in Lebanon, 7 of 110 
(6.4%) seats of the lower house in Jordan, 8 of 454 (1.8%) seats of the lower house in Egypt, 30 
of 389 (7.7%) seats of the lower house in Algeria, 34/325 (10.5%) in Morocco, and 31 of 250 
(12.4%) in Syria.  
 
Some Arab countries have tried to increase the representation of women in key positions. 
Recently, Arab countries like Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan have adopted quotas that guarantee 
the representation of women. These countries have reserved parliamentary seats specifically for 
women; Morocco has set aside 30 of a total 325 parliamentary seats; Jordan, 6 out of 110; and 
Tunisia, 38 of 152 seats. Algeria has party quotas for women. Morocco also adopted the 
Mudawanna reform package in 2004, one of the most pro-women sets of reforms in the Arab 
world. The number of female politicians elected at the communal level in Morocco’s 2003 
elections rose from 84 to 127, but that remained out of a total of 22,944 elected officials. 
Lebanon’s women hold less than 1% of all seats at the municipal level. The King of Morocco 
appointed the first female Royal Counselor, Zoulikha Nasri, and in 2006 President Bashhar Al-
Asad appointed Dr. Najah Al-Attar as a second vice president for cultural affairs. She is the first 
Arab female to hold that position. Egypt has instituted different forms of quotas, but none are 
currently in effect.  At the ministerial levels, Arab states employ a larger concentration of women 
in key public offices.
17
 In fact, Lebanon ranks 4
th





employs women as prominent judges in the Female Shura Assembly. Although women are 
under-represented in elected or appointed positions, their employment in key government offices 
is on the rise. Women, for instance, occupy prominent positions in the United Arab Emirate’s 
Ministry of Education. The UAE Ministry of Planning reported that female employees exceeded 
male employees in the more than 25 federal ministries; in 2001, 16,223 workers were women, 
and only 9,518, men.
19
   
 
These advancements are note-worthy, but noticeable deficiencies still loom large. The limited 
presence of women in parliament has raised considerable concern among observers and policy 
makers alike. Egypt’s Amr Mousa, for instance, has suggested that women’s status in the Arab 
world will improve only when they hold prominent decision-making positions. In Morocco, 
women’s parliamentary participation hastened the adoption of the family code provisions of 
2004. Yet, a recent examination
20
 of the last four reigning Egyptian parliaments seems to imply 
that female presence has had no direct effect on the levels of gender issues raised in 
parliamentary sessions.  
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Arab women active in political life are not content with the current status quo. Complicating 
issues, most women do not see the formal legislative process as a viable means to improve their 
condition. 68% of Arab women MPs are dissatisfied with the current level of women’s political 
participation. And 80% of women active in public life claim that they could accomplish their 




Several political, material, social, and cultural conditions continue to stifle women’s ability to 
attain their goals. Political parties remain weak and ineffectual, thereby reducing their impact on 
policy. The rule of law, too, remains weak in the Arab world, and though some laws 
guaranteeing women’s participation in the public sphere exist, they need to be enforced. The lack 
of legislation promoting women’s presence in parliament also explains their continued 
marginalization. Only one in every two women in the Arab world is literate; as a result, their 
overall political awareness is quite low. Reactionary forces seek to exclude women from the 
public and political spheres, and many current political regimes promote these conservative 
elements. Prior to unification, half of the judges in South Yemen were women, but since, 
conservative forces have reappointed these women to clerical positions.
22
 In fact, the patriarchal 
political environment is not favorably inclined towards equal participation in the political sphere. 
This was demonstrated in the Kuwait (2006), where though for the first time women were able to 
vote in the elections, not a single woman won a parliamentary seat. However, this trend was 
reversed in the 2009 election, where four women, Aseel al-Awadhi Rola Dashti, Salwa al-Jassar 
and Masouma al-Mubarak won parliamentary seats. 
 
Other factors, including the lack of political party support for and backing of female candidates, 
have also hindered women’s formal participation. Deficient media support and limited 
democratic norms result in the manipulation of electoral processes and their results. A 
disjunction between women’s civil organizations and current women MPs encumbers the 
advancement of women’s issues in legislative processes.
23
 Familial dynamics, too, promote male 
at the expense of female political participation. As Nayla Mouawad, a female Lebanese 
parliamentary member, comments, ―[i]t is still very exceptional to see a woman in the position of 
family leader.‖ 
 
Finally, the dismal state of Arab economies structures women’s access to the public sphere. As 
standards of living decline and employment rates rise, women are becoming unable to afford the 
education necessary to enhance their human capital.  Depressed economic conditions widen the 
digital gap between Arab countries and the rest of the world. This technology gap disadvantages 
Arab women in particular; without the ability to network virtually, they cannot participate in key 
transnational debates about gender empowerment. Nor do they have easy access to current 
information within their own nations. The Moroccan Mudawana, though applauded 
internationally, still remains foreign to many Moroccan women who have yet to hear about the 
reform package and understand their rights. This has prompted Liz Cheney, in 2005, to allocate 
another 2 million dollars under the State Department’s MEPI initiative to increase awareness 
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 With a population that has close to a 70% illiteracy rate in the country-side, 
raising awareness among Moroccan women will be a considerable challenge. The impediments 
to meaningful gender representation are thus located not only in political realities of the region 
but also in economic and cultural realities.  
 
4. Arab Women in Cross-National Perspective 
Although women face setbacks, we do see improvements across time in the standing of women 
across Arab States. Gender Empowerment Measures (GEM) and the Gender Development Index 
(GDI) indicate that there have been some note-worthy advancements for women. Yet, some 
scholars and analysts have argued that GDI and GEM measurements are biased towards women 
in the Arab world because they don’t focus on agricultural or informal sector income.
25 
 
Nevertheless there is value to these scores, especially when we compare them across time and to 
other regions.   
 
An examination of the graphs below illustrates that Arab women are significantly doing worse 
than other women elsewhere across the globe. Only one region systematically fares worse than 
the Arab regions, and that is sub-Saharan Africa. The below graphs illustrate that women do 
worst on a number of indicators, including percentage of women in government, percentage of 
women in parliament, the literacy gap between men and women, and economic activity ratio. 
The one area where Arab governments have done well, it appears, is in the area of closing down 
the educational ratio between men and women. Yet, only one out of every two women is literate.  
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Female participation in political life is important for a variety of factors. First, when women are 
visible as leaders in a given society, they dispel the myth that they are incapable of leading. 
Thus, institutionalizing female patterns of leadership is important for changing culturally held 
values that see women as incompetent in the political sphere. Second, women are more likely 
than men to advance demands for an increased appreciation of respect for gender equality. Third, 
when women lead,  they are also more likely to be sympathetic to the issues that concern women 
the most, especially as they pertain  to state services and benefits, like maternity leave policies, 
that will empower women  to participate effectively in public, social, economic and political life. 
 
Yet,  there are reasons to remain skeptical about the influence of women in the political sphere. 
The primary reason is that women in Arab states are confined to settings that are not themselves 
democratic in nature. Arab elections in the region often have less to do with democracy and more 
to do with the distribution of clientelistic benefits and services. Since parliamentary candidates 
cannot influence policy, they utilize the political system as a means of distributing favors to local 
constituents in the form of wasta.
26
 This means that even women who do access political power 
must participate in this system of patrimony, which privileges existing patriarchal networks. 
Hence, women become agents sustaining the status quo rather than agents of change. The ability 
of women to influence policy outside clientelistic networks is limited. Further, the space for 
political mobilization is encumbered by the regime. And as highlighted above, even in areas 
where women can influence change through policy, the rule of law in many states remains weak. 
Finally, and a theme that will be discussed in more detail below, women’s rights in the Arab 
region are governed by personal status edicts and are protected by the religious establishments in 
each country.  
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It should be noted that there is a long history of women’s participation in political life in many 
Arab states. In 1959, Iraq appointed its first female minister. Egypt followed suit in 1956, and 
Algeria did the same in 1962. Today, we witness an increase in government appointments of 
women  to key offices, as  captured in Graph 2. Yet, such appointments fall well behind the 
global average. Further, these appointments are often made to elite women who are already 
invested in the political status quo. Most often, these appointments are made solely to appease 
the donor community.  
 
Further, in many of these societies, women take less of a general interest in politics than men,and 
it appears that they have less access to political venues. Data from the Arab Barometer (2006-
2007) in seven Arab countries—Palestine, Algeria, Morocco, Kuwait, Lebanon, Yemen and 
Jordan—find that on average men are more likely to be interested in politics (45% to 33%); men  
are more likely to have used a wasta (33% to 28%), women are more likely than men to have 
never protested (79% to 66%), and a similar percentage reports that they have never signed a 
petition. When asked to name the foreign minister, 31% of women—compared to 19% of men—
did not know. And most interestingly, women more than men indicated that the Tribe was a very 
important consideration for them when they allocated their vote. Close to 55% of Arab women 
(compared to 48% of Arab men) believe that allocating their vote based strictly  on tribal 
allegiances is very important— despite the fact that the tribal structure of Arab societies remains 
the most patriarchal and women within these networks on average are relegated to the status of 
sustainers and subjects in need of protection. This then raises the question of whether women 
find comfort and reassurance in these structures more than other available networks and 
pathways. In the absence of efficient state structures to protect the status of women and without 
the  economic opportunities that create the necessary conditions for self-sufficiency, will women 




















                                                 
27  See Lara Deeb. An Enchanted Modern. Gender and Public Piety in Shia Lebanon. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006;  and Valentine Moghadam. Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle 





Graph 3: Women and Political Activity 
 
































































































The literacy gap remains quite large in the Arab world, compared to global trends. Only one 
region, sub-Saharan Africa, does worse on these literacy gap measures. Astonishingly, the Arab 
world is far more economically advanced than many countries in the Sub-African continent. One 
of every two women in the Arab region remains illiterate. In some countries, like Morocco, 
estimates have it that two-thirds of the female population is illiterate. These numbers are 
formidable and exemplify the inefficiencies of states, educational systems, and donor programs 
altogether. Illiterate women have more difficulty understanding their own rights. They are more 
likely to seek the protection of patriarchal networks that disadvantage them. Further, without 
being equipped with the fundamental right to read, they are incapable of obtaining the necessary 
information to articulate their own self-interest. Illiterate women are more likely to raise their 
children, both female and male, to reinforce the system of hierarchy and privilege for males and  
one of subordination to females. This takes the forms of the domestic division of labor and 
expectations about female involvement in political, social and economic life. Many a donor 
program designed to increase women’s awareness and democratic forms of engagements 
assumes, a priori, that women have the knowledge to read and write. Discussing advancements 
in gender equality must acknowledge the need to equip women with the right to read.  
 


















































































Arab women’s economic activity ratio as a proportion of men’s employment remains drastically 
low. The region has seen mild improvements in economic ratio scores across the years. Less than 
35% of women participate in economic activity in the region, against a global average of 56%. 





at 69%. The sources of these dismal economic levels of participation rest on three primary 
reasons. First, the prevailing male culture privileges domestic labor and child rearing above and 
beyond labor force participation as arenas of women's work. Further, in many countries, women 
can’t work without the consent of their husbands or fathers. Second, job scarcity and 
unemployment continue to disadvantage women’s economic participation. Third, high 
reproductive rates remain a key disadvantage to women’s labor force participation. In the Arab 
States, the lowest rate of women’s participation in the labor market occurs in the occupied 
Palestinian territories, one of the areas with the highest birth rate and the state with the highest 
rate of early marriage.  Meanwhile, states such as Tunisia present the opposite pattern, with low 
recorded rates of early marriage, low fertility rates (2.1 compared to 4.2 for the Arab region) and 
a high rate of economic participation (32%).  
 
Women’s labor force participation has also been hindered by a lack of support services. While 
economic opportunities remain limited in the region, dependency ratios remain the highest in the 
world. Each worker in the Arab region supports more than two non-working people. This is 




The World Bank Report of 2003 called the unemployment crisis an ―unprecedented challenge,‖ 
and it alerted regional specialists that over 80 million new jobs had to be created in the next two 
decades to absorb the aspirations of the growing youth population. Without political reforms, the 
report cautioned, the degree of economic reforms necessary would be difficult to achieve. 
Unemployment for the entire group of Arab countries is about 15%. Combined unemployment 
and underemployment is as high as 20–25 percent. In Algeria it is at 30 percent; in the West 
Bank and Gaza it could be as high as 35–50 percent—in some areas, even as much as 75 percent. 
First-time job seekers have the worst of it, and about 80 percent of the unemployed in Egypt are 
in this position. Since 1980, real wages for almost all occupations have declined in Egypt. 
Exacerbating this bleak economic predicament, the Arab world’s share of world trade has 
declined from 38 percent in the 1980s to 3 percent in the early 2000s.
29
 In inflation-adjusted 
dollars, as of 2002 not a single Arab country had maintained the income level it had in 1982. 
 
The economic development infrastructure remains weak in the region. Unlike the experiences of 
women in some western societies that experienced massive export-led growth and 
industrialization, necessitating additional female labor in the market, this has not been the case in 
the Arab region. And although some countries like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia witness that women 
possess much wealth, it should be noted that such wealth is often passed through patriarchal 
structures. Thus, women find themselves reinforcing both the patriarchal and often politically 
authoritarian structures to maintain economically self-sufficiency.  
 
It should also be noted that women’s economic empowerment need not produce a direct route to 
the acquisition of individual rights. Saudi women possess 70% of the wealth within Saudi 
Arabia—but yet, little advancement has been made on gender issues. Wealth might assuage more 
demands—especially if it from the form of oil rents—where women are not necessarily 
                                                 
28 Valentine Moghadam. Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East. Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 2003; The Arab Human Development Report: The Rise of Women in the Arab World. UNDP, 2005.     





undergoing processes of labor mobilization and skills acquisition that may serve as useful 
elements in terms of demanding rights from the states 
 
Finally, poverty remains an undeniable reality in the lives of many women in the region. The 
UNDP found that when the Gender Empowerment Index was treated as a dependent variable 
(that which is to be explained), poverty systematically came up as positively and significantly 
linked to a lack in gender empowerment. According to the UNDP:  
 
The results of the analysis show that the spread of income poverty on average 
leads to the disempowerment of women… as compared to men. Income poverty 
also leads to the disenfranchisement of women in the areas of parliamentary 












































































Where Arab countries have made significant advancements is in the area of education. Basically, 
Arab states have now closed the gap between men and women in (combined) gross enrollment 
rates for all levels of education. It is noteworthy that governments have received little criticism 
from conservative sectors of society for actively encouraging and empowering women in the 
educational sphere. Nor has the Islamic establishment resisted the educational attainment of 
females. This is an issue worthy of continued exploration. It does appear, however, that Islamic 
interpretation sanctions educational attainment for females as is encapsulated in the Prophetic 
sayings: ―Seek knowledge, even if it were in China‖ and ―Seeking knowledge is a religious duty 
for every Muslim, man or woman.‖ This should raise the issue of whether issues pertaining to 
Islamic jurisprudence must accompany strategies to improve the status of women across the 






Yet, these increasing levels of education, have unfortunately not led to an increase in women’s 
labor force participation or political decision-making capacity. Thus, education on its own, 
although important, needs to be accompanied by strategies that  
 
5. Islamism, Sharia, Personal Status and the Rights of Women: 
Personal status laws are by far the most prohibitive to women’s advancement. The problematic is 
two-fold. On the one hand, the personal status system supplements the legal system in upholding 
laws that treat women as subjects of their male relatives. Second, the system promotes 
patriarchal structures, so that women have become totally reliant and dependent on the very 
institutions that continue to deny them equal footing.
30
 Even  improvement in the Rule of Law,  
good governance, and the expansion of democracy—which might lead to better implementation 
of personal status laws—will not address the core issue at hand: the personal status laws 
themselves need to be reformulated in ways that allow for the compatibility of Islam with the 
principles of equality between men and women. Even more importantly, it appears that the donor 
community is at an overwhelming disadvantage in dealing with these matters. These issues are 
considered to be Islamic, domestic and indigenous, and therefore ―protected‖ from foreign 
intervention. Personal status laws need to be reformulated and they need to be dealt with on the 
level of the logic that drives their legitimacy. As existing conservative Islamic interpretations 
inspire the existing personal status laws, so too the basis of their reformulation should be located 
in Islamic practice, jurisprudence, and rationale.  
 
It must be noted that the international donor community has not adequately dealt with the issue 
of Islamic jurisprudence and its overwhelming influence on the status of women. This is perhaps 
due to the fact that donor agencies operate within a secular framework, where religion should not 
impede the status of women. Or perhaps, there’s an assumption driving the donor community 
that democracy is the route to lessening the influence of religion in the public sphere. For 
whatever the reason, the continued relegation of Islamic interpretation to conservative sectors of 
Arab societies has and continues to terribly disadvantage women, to the arguable extent that 
without a constructive and meaningful way to address the issue of Islam and jurisprudence, the 
status of Arab women will continue to lag behind the rights of women elsewhere in the world.  
 
There are emergent avenues in the MENA region, including local charitable societies, mosque 
networks, university programs, women’s research centers that attempt to create a more favorable 
understanding of Islamic jurisprudence. In fact, it is common to find secular women’s 
organizations collaborating with and establishing coalitions with Islamic women’s associations 
to advance the cause of women’s rights. These coalitions have been a major force driving 
women’s empowerment in Jordan, Morocco, Palestine, Egypt, and Kuwait, for example.  
 
Arguably, the existing situation in Arab societies, through which Islamic jurisprudence 
reinforces the inferiority of women, is in complete disregard of the general ethos of the Quran, 
which recognizes the equality of the genders in several verses. Further, several of the existing 
interpretations about women rely on the most conservative and disputed accounts of female 
                                                 





treatment in the tradition of Hadith. What is often missing from our analysis of the potency of 
Islamic interpretations on the status of women is that Islamic jurists are heavily influenced by 
customs and traditions when passing edicts that impact the lives of women. Further, Islamic 
jurists tend to gravitate towards the Islamically-prized ethos of social cohesion and harmony. So 
in order to not disrupt the balance between traditional and modern, Islamic jurists continue to 
reinforce the subjugation of women and reify patriarchy as a means of preserving harmony, 
however disadvantageous this is to women. Hence, men continue to be given priority in matters 




Existing personal status laws claim to protect women. And although there are indeed many 
protections for women in the personal status laws, there also remain discriminatory policies that 
continue to deny women their basic human rights. These disempowering personal status 
formulations are specially located in laws that guide marriage, divorce, and child custody. It is 
important to note that the personal status laws are not monolithic across states; nevertheless, it 
appears they enjoy significant support in many quarters of Arab society. Where women have 
made significant advancements in their rights, it is because they were able to convince those who 
upheld discriminatory personal status laws that the Islamic basis or rationale behind such 
legislation was faulty. Taking on the Islamic interpretations has proven successful to women. 
Unfortunately, the Western donor community is less equipped to deal with this strategy, nor has 
it necessarily embraced religion in its strategic implementation of laws.  
 
Where we have witnessed successes in gender reform in the personal status laws, it is in 
countries that actively took on the justification of Islam for the continued subordination of 
women. Further, regimes have proven to be very salient in by-passing anti-women stances, 
especially those held by Islamist actors within parliaments as well. Tunis and Morocco are 
examples of two such regimes. More recently, women obtained the right to vote in Kuwait. 





6. Methodological Challenges 
Democracy and good governance on their own will not be sufficient to addressing the dire need 
to reformulate personal status clauses across the region.  If anything, more effective government 
might prove useful to better implementation of these clauses. Even in situations where women 
can benefit from the personal status laws, like in obtaining child support from their ex-husbands, 
the legal system is too inefficient. Court files frequently get lost and cases are transferred from 
court to court. It is a far more useful strategy to seek the help and support of male kin and sharia 
courts to obtain compliance in matters related to personal status than the state legal system. This 
means that women have very few channels of recourse, outside the institutions of personal status. 
Further, women rely on and reinforce the patriarchal structures within society to attempt to gain 
their rights and standing because these institutions are more effective. 
                                                 
31  Valentine Moghadam. Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East. Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 2003; The Arab Human Development Report: The Rise of Women in the Arab World. UNDP, 2005 
32  Amaney Jamal and Vickie Langohr. ―Moving Beyond Democracy: What Causes Variation in the Level of 






Any strategy that is designed to empower women must begin to address the social and economic 
structures that have led to their marginalization. Economic development, creation of jobs and 
opportunities as well as a constructive engagement with ―religious‖ society may be the most 
obvious routes to pursue to advance the cause of gender equality.  
 
Today, a new phenomenon appears to be sweeping the Arab region: the importance of satellite 
stations and television programs in issuing fatwas and Islamic jurisprudence on matters relating 
to women. Yet, these very programs, like ―Sharia and Life‖ and others, continue to promote an 
image of women as completely dependent on the male members of society. These programs are 
very popular and are considered modern by technological standards. Yet, they continue to adopt 
regressive models of Islamic jurisprudence. This market remains fruitful for introducing new 





Other challenges remain. The Arab world is a war-torn and politically tumultuous region. The 
imminent fear of war affects the Arab family in profound ways. Certainly, wars reinforce the 
roles of women as care-takers of their husbands, relatives and children. In general, war and 
insecurity are not conducive to advancing individual rights. Further, the authoritarian realities of 
the region continue to deny women the opportunities to effectively mobilize in society. 
Advocacy groups are often limited in the opportunities before them to demand change. Further, 
as the section highlighted above, even if democracy and good governance were to evolve, there 
is no guarantee that socially conservative sectors of society will not use these channels to further 
deny women opportunities for empowerment. Finally, the dire economic situation in the region, 
coupled with the high levels of unemployment, remain major obstacles for the advancement of 
women.  
 
7. Other Marginalized Sectors 
Other marginalized segments of Arab women remain. Women in rural and desert areas are 
generally poverty-stricken with very few opportunities for economic advancement. These areas 
are normally ruled by families and tribes. The existence of women in rural and desert area (far 
away from state institutions) reinforces their need for protection from male family members. 
Hence, patriarchal norms are strong in the countryside and more remote desert regions. Further, 
in many of these circles women lack education, social support, health care and nutrition. Their 
overall well-being is completely linked to that of male relatives. The staggering levels of 
illiteracy among females in these rural areas means young women cannot read or write and are 
not knowledgeable of their own rights.  
 
Squatter settlements are yet other geographic locales that continue to disadvantage women. 
Residents have low technical skills and low levels of education. These factors do not bode well 
for economic improvements. Rates of divorce are higher in these settlements, with women 
heading their households. These women in general know little about their own rights. They 
                                                 






normally don’t possess the necessary documentation, like their birth certificates, marriage 
certificates or divorce papers to claim services from the state or other organizations. These 
women, therefore, are also very susceptible to male violence and abuse.  
 
8. International Efforts and Donor Priorities: Emerging Areas of Research 
The conundrum of women’s rights in the Arab world is that it is located between the priorities of 
the donor community and authoritarian regimes that need to continue to appease the conservative 
and traditional Islamic sectors in society. This has resulted in a simultaneous strategy of offering 
cosmetic gestures to the donor community while simultaneously reinforcing patriarchal norms 
and dictates. It is within this environment that the donor community has had to set its priorities. 
 
The most effective and perhaps promising outlet has been organizational programs that target 
women themselves. Increasing their empowerment at the societal level, equipping them with 
necessary skills to make economic choices, and raising their own awareness about their rights 
have proven useful. These programs include advocacy groups, women’s empowerment groups 
and other women-centric organizations. Yet, these strategies remain inefficient in addressing the 
overall burdens and obstacles women face on a day-to-day level. First, it must be noted that 
women already demonstrate a stronger commitment towards gender equality than men. Graph 7, 
below, illustrates that on all attitudes related to gender equality women do better than men.   
Second, women are located in states that are not democratic. Thus, the mere notion of policy 
preferences resulting in policy outcomes should not be overstated. And finally, personal status 
issues, legitimated by conservative and Islamic traditional interpretations, remain a key obstacle 
for women. 
 
Graph 7 below indicates that on numerous scores, women out-perform men in terms of holding 
attitudes more favorable for their own advancement. Whether women and men could attend class 
together receives 62% of support from women and 58% of men.  While 31% of men believe 
university education is more important for a boy, only 19% of women hold this view. Women 
are far more likely to believe that women can be prime ministers in Muslim countries (65% to 
48%), and men are more likely to hold the view that men make better political leaders than 
women (75% to 68%). 58% of women compared to 56% of men believe that women are not 
required to wear the hijab. While 88% of women held the view that married women should be 
able to work, only 72% of men share that viewpoint. 78% of women believe they should have 
equal job opportunities as men, but only 62% of men share that assessment. Finally, 90% of 
women believe they should get equal wages for equal work, while 77% of men support this. On 
all scores, women are more likely to hold attitudes that advance their own notions of gender 
equality. This, then, raises the question of whether women should continue to be targets of donor 
assistance programs that raise awareness. Should men not also be recipients of such programs, 
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Further, donor efforts should concentrate on institutional changes that can lead to greater 
empowerment for women. Women need more democratic space, more effective governance and 
a reformulation of the personal status codes. The existing international commitment to improve 
the status of women has normally focused on a two-tier approach. The first is to pressure states 
to accommodate the interests of women. And the second is to empower women through civil 
society activity and programs. These civil society activities include raising levels of political 
awareness, education and skills to improve the daily welfare of ordinary women across the 
region.  
 
According to Valentine Moghadam, there are seven groups of civil society organizations that 
support positive changes in women’s rights. These include service or charitable organizations, 
official or state-affiliated women’s organizations, professional associations, women’s studies 
centers, women’s right or feminist groups, NGOs working on women’s and developing issues, 
and worker-based or grassroots women’s groups.
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 These organizations have all been 
beneficiaries of donor assistance, and their salience and importance should not be 
underestimated. 
 
What is remarkably absent in many parts of the Arab world, however, are avenues for women to 
prosper socially as individuals in society. There is a dearth of sports clubs, libraries, arts and 
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crafts workshops, and extra-curricular events that can play very important roles in the 
empowerment of young women. These social avenues are pertinent for enhancing self-
confidence, social capital, and a sense of efficacy within society. These outlets also enhance 
women’s productivity, intellectual and creative thinking, and offer different opportunities in life.  
 
Further, the donor community has done less with the direct issue of personal status laws. Mosque 
groups, Islamic charities, Islamic universities, and Islamic social service organizations should be 
targeted by donors to work together to enhance a more humane reformulation of personal status 
issues. Women within these circles must also be empowered to stake their claims on citizenship 
rights. There is consensus among both the policy and scholarly communities that the regressive 
personal status laws are a major impediment to the advancement of women. What is less clear is 
what available pathways and mechanisms are available to make these changes. It doesn’t appear 
that it is suffice to ask existing authoritarian leaders, who already lack legitimacy, to make these 
changes. There needs to be a donor commitment to instigate change from within, by partnering 
with local Islamic organizations that seek change but lack the means to affect it. 
 
Where we’ve seen successful reform it has been through reinterpreting and advancing Islamic 
understandings of gender equality. These negotiations on gender within an Islamic framework 
require sophisticated analysis of the texts. The more women can claim that they have ―studied‖ 
the Islamic rationale for gender reforms the more legitimate their claims in the public sphere. 
Thus, efforts to empower women to advance understandings of Islamic jurisprudence in line with 
gender equality in their mosques, civic associations, and schools need to be promoted and 
supported. It will be indeed unfortunate if the continued modus operandi is one that assumes 
democracy can neutralize the influence of the personal status codes, that somehow and someway 
democracy will capably change the roots of these value systems. Maybe that will happen over 
time, but not in the foreseeable future; witness, for instance, how Islamist movements have used 
democratic openings to block reforms on gender. The most obvious case here is Jordan where the 
Islamic Action Front (IAF) has successfully blocked measures to reform the existing honor 
killing clauses that ―reward‖ male perpetrators leniency in punishment.  
 
While the West will never be seen as a favorable agent to promote such activity, some countries 
still have a kinder image in the region, like Canada, and may be better positioned to work with 
local actors on these issues. International agencies may consider working with groups of 
Muslims in countries that have already passed progressive gender laws. These laws can be used 
as a template to circulate throughout the Arab region. Some might argue that democracy should 
be a-religious, and that there should be no room for religious accommodation of practices that 
are seen to discriminate against any person or creed. Engaging the religious paradigm has often 
received skepticism from foreign donors and Western audiences. The engagement of religion for 
the purpose of political and social rights is often frowned upon within the development 
enterprise, and it directly shapes aid allocations. In a nutshell, donor agencies would prefer not to 
fund religious organizations overtly, especially if there are secular substitutes on the ground. 
This strategy however may be misplaced. Indeed, it has hurt the ability of both secular and 
―Islamist‖ women from advocating their causes. Secular movements are then tarnished as un-
Islamic and accused of warming up to the US. Islamist movements are hurt because their 
programs are undermined by the West, denying Muslims the right to re-evaluate their own texts 





of tension in the region, one that in my opinion has unfairly resulted in women being the casualty 
of this Western vs. Eastern discourse.  
 
The point is clear. The Western donor community has not been able—or, quite frankly, willing—
to deal with Islamic jurisprudence when it comes to issues of women’s rights. Opponents of 
women’s rights in the Arab world have unfortunately successfully portrayed Western efforts to 
address gender discrimination as part of a larger geo-political pattern of repression and 
colonization. This has to be acknowledged by the donor community. Geo-strategic 
considerations trump the rights of women and the ideals of democracy in the region. In the 
meantime, women in the Arab world remain the most subjugated cohort of women across the 
globe.  
 
9. Summation of Key Strategies and Points 
 The dissemination of information needs to take into account regional networks. 
 Male religious scholars need to be on board.  
 Social clubs, sports clubs, and social programming for young women should be 
encouraged. 
 There is a critical need to adopt independent interpretative reasoning in Islamic 
jurisprudence.  
 Promote Islamist female jurists through Mosques and women’s circles/Halaqas. 
 Continue affirmative action programs in all fields of human activity. 
 Employ satellite television to educating about women’s rights, increase awareness, and 
Islamic jurisprudence in favor of women. 
 An infrastructure for women’s empowerment needs to be developed, including shelters, 
daycares and pre-schools. 
 Reducing poverty and enhancing job creation is central. 
 War and occupation is not conducive to democracy or women’s empowerment 
